Skip to content

Verified against Salesforce docs: November 2026

Salesforce MFA Enforcement Update: What Was Paused, What Still Applies, and the Revised 2026 Dates

Salesforce paused both 2026 MFA tiers over a security-key bug and restarted them from 20 July by release group. What moved, and where extensions stand now.

Updated 6 November 2026. Both tiers moved, not just one. The first version of this post said phishing-resistant MFA for admins reached production on 1 July and was never paused. Salesforce's own change log on article 005321563 says otherwise: production enforcement was "scheduled to start July 20, 2026 (moved from July 1)", and the sandbox start moved from 22 June to 6 July, then to 10 July. Both tiers then ran on release-group schedules from 20 July, and the last groups (Japan and Korea on 1 September, all remaining instances on 3 September) finished on 3 September 2026. The sections below have been corrected.

Extensions also have new rules. If your org held a temporary extension until October 2026, that end date no longer applies. Salesforce says it "is extending the enforcement deadline for orgs with a temporary extension" and will send the new date directly, at least 30 days before it lands. Support can't give you the date. Since 3 November, each extended control has its own release update in Setup (for example, Finish Preparing for MFA Enforcement for All Employee Users), showing an Enforcement Scheduled date and a self-service tool for one more 90-day extension. You can't get a second one.

TL;DR

  • Salesforce paused enforcement of standard MFA for all employee users after a bug in the phishing-resistant enrolment flow, where users with existing security keys were wrongly prompted to register new ones.
  • Both tiers moved. Sandbox enforcement, originally 22 June, restarted on 10 July. Production, originally 1 July for admins and 20 July for everyone else, started on 20 July 2026 for both and ran by release group until 3 September.
  • Phishing-resistant MFA for privileged users and admins was not cancelled. It was delayed by the same bug and enforced by release group from 20 July, alongside the all-employee tier.
  • The rest of the 2026 wave is unaffected: email domain verification, the report-export step-up and Transaction Security Policy controls, and the network controls that shipped earlier all stand.
  • A pause is not a reprieve. Use the extra days to verify enforcement actually applied, build a lockout recovery runbook, and move human logins off integration accounts before the exemption stops covering them.

What You'll Learn

  • Exactly which enforcement Salesforce paused, and which went ahead on schedule
  • The revised dates, and why a working login on the deadline still does not prove you are compliant
  • How to confirm enforcement actually took in an org, using Salesforce's own tools
  • A recovery runbook for locked-out admins, including the case where there is no second admin
  • Why integration and service accounts need attention now, because the old MFA exemption changed

The Problem

For weeks the message was that mid-2026 is when Salesforce stops asking and starts enforcing MFA. Then, days before the biggest date, the plan moved. Salesforce paused enforcement of standard MFA for all employee users, and a lot of admins read "paused" as "cancelled" and quietly closed the tab.

That is the risk. The pause was short and temporary, and it did not cancel the tier that actually locks admins out. The phishing-resistant requirement for privileged users moved by less than three weeks. Report-export controls are still coming. And the pause exists because of a real enrolment bug, not because Salesforce changed its mind about enforcement. An org that treats the pause as a reason to stop preparing is going to meet the rescheduled date in exactly the state it was in before, which is the state that made enforcement risky in the first place.

Common questions this article answers:

  • Did Salesforce delay MFA enforcement, and which part exactly?
  • What are the new dates, and is 20 July still real?
  • Did phishing-resistant MFA for admins get pushed back too?
  • What should I actually do with the extra time?

Quick Answer

Salesforce paused both MFA tiers: standard MFA for all employee users and phishing-resistant MFA for privileged users. Sandbox enforcement, first set for 22 June, restarted on 10 July 2026. Production started on 20 July 2026 for both tiers (the admin tier moved from 1 July) and ran by release group until 3 September. The reason was a defect in which users who already had a security key registered were incorrectly prompted to enrol a new one during phishing-resistant MFA setup. The phishing-resistant tier was delayed, not cancelled. Everything else in the 2026 security wave, email verification and the report-export controls in particular, is on track. Salesforce has been explicit that this is paused, not cancelled, and that MFA and phishing-resistant MFA remain required. Because the rollout is staggered and dates can move again, confirm the exact schedule on Salesforce's live enforcement articles before you plan around a specific day.

What Salesforce paused, and what it did not

It helps to separate the two enforcement tiers. Both moved, and both still apply.

Standard MFA for all employee users is the broad requirement that every internal user completes multi-factor authentication. It was paused along with the admin tier. Salesforce placed both on hold, then republished a revised schedule rather than an open-ended delay. In Salesforce's own words, enforcement was "briefly delayed" while it "worked to resolve an issue in which users with existing security keys were incorrectly prompted to register new ones during the phishing-resistant MFA enrollment process."

Phishing-resistant MFA for privileged users and admins is the stricter tier: anyone with the System Administrator profile, or the Modify All Data, View All Data, Customize Application, or Author Apex permission, must use a security key, a built-in authenticator, a passkey, or certificate-based authentication. Authenticator apps and push approvals do not count. This tier was not cancelled. Its production start moved from 1 July to 20 July 2026, and from there it followed the same release groups as the all-employee tier.

So "MFA enforcement delayed" was true for a few weeks and then stopped being true. Both tiers have now been enforced, apart from orgs holding an extension.

The revised 2026 dates

Here is the current shape of the two MFA tiers, alongside the other controls that did not move. Treat the staggering as the important detail: each date is when a wave begins, not a single cutover.

Control Sandbox Production Status
Phishing-resistant MFA for privileged users and admins 10 July 2026 (moved from 22 June) 20 July to 3 September 2026 by release group (moved from 1 July) Enforced
Standard MFA for all employee users 10 July 2026 (moved from 22 June) 20 July to 3 September 2026 by release group Enforced
Step-up authentication and default TSP on report exports 22 June 2026 13 July 2026 On track
Email domain verification Earlier in 2026 Earlier in 2026 Already enforced
VPN, proxy, and high-risk IP blocking Earlier in 2026 24 April 2026 Already enforced

The trap that catches people is the staggered rollout. Salesforce enforces in waves, so a login that still works on the morning of a date is not proof of compliance; your org may simply not have been reached yet. That was true before the pause and it is more true now that the all-employee production wave is spread over more days. Do not read "it still works" as "we are fine."

Because this situation is still moving, confirm the live dates before you act. The two enforcement articles to watch are "Prepare for MFA Enforcement for All Employee Users" (Salesforce Help 005321561) and "Prepare for Phishing-Resistant MFA Enforcement for Privileged Users including Admins" (005321563).

Why the pause happened

The cause matters, because it tells you where to look in your own org. The defect was in enrolment, not in policy: users who already had a security key registered were prompted, incorrectly, to register a brand-new one during phishing-resistant MFA setup. For an admin staring at that prompt on enforcement day, the experience is indistinguishable from being told their existing key no longer works, which is exactly the kind of confusion that turns a rollout into a flood of support tickets.

Salesforce paused the broad enforcement to fix that flow rather than push it onto every employee at once. The practical read for you is simple. If your admins registered keys early, confirm those keys still authenticate cleanly now that the fix is in, and do not let anyone re-register a second key in a panic and lose track of which one is real. Registering two deliberate methods per admin is good practice; registering a mystery third because a buggy prompt asked for it is not.

What is still on track

The pause was specific to the all-employee MFA tier. The rest of the 2026 wave did not move, and it is easy to lose sight of that in the noise about MFA.

Email domain verification and the network-level controls (VPN, proxy, and high-risk IP blocking) already enforced earlier in 2026. The report controls are the ones still ahead of most orgs: step-up authentication on report actions, step-up on anomalous exports, and a default Transaction Security Policy that challenges report exports above 10,000 records, all reaching production around 13 July 2026. If your org has no Transaction Security Policy of its own, Salesforce creates a default one for you on that date, and a default you did not design is more likely to surprise your users than one you wrote. It is better to define your own before the date than to inherit the default. We cover the full list and its logic in Salesforce Security Enforcement in 2026: Every Change, Date, and What Admins Must Do.

Do not down tools: verify, recover, and lock down

The right use of the extra days is not to wait. It is to close the three gaps that turn any enforcement date into an incident.

Verify that enforcement actually applied

Do not infer compliance from a working login. Check it directly. In Setup, open Identity Verification at [MyDomain]/lightning/setup/IdentityVerification/home. If the box "Require multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all direct UI logins to your Salesforce org" is selected and greyed out so you cannot deselect it, enforcement is active for that environment. If it is still editable, you are pre-enforcement and can turn it on yourself in a sandbox to rehearse. After a date passes, watch Login History for users still failing the second factor, and remember that a sandbox refresh wipes MFA verifiers, so a freshly refreshed sandbox can lock out every admin at once until someone re-enrols.

The lockout recovery runbook

Decide the recovery path before you need it, because the moment you need it is the moment nobody can log in to fix it.

  • If a privileged user is locked out and another admin is available, the second admin generates a temporary identity verification code, disconnects the old method, and has the user re-register a phishing-resistant method. This is the normal path and it takes minutes.
  • If there is no second admin, recovery runs through Salesforce Support, which is slower and is precisely why every admin should register at least two phishing-resistant methods in advance, a primary key and a backup, so one lost key is never a lockout.
  • The old exemption no longer saves you here. The "Waive Multi-Factor Authentication for Exempt Users" permission stops waiving interactive UI logins, and restoring any exemption now requires a Salesforce Support case rather than a checkbox. Do not plan around the waiver for human users.

Integration users and the exemption that changed

This is the quiet failure mode. The MFA requirement targets interactive UI and SSO logins, and API-only integration logins remain out of scope, but only if they are genuinely API-only. Two things bite here. First, the Waive-MFA permission now applies only to those API-only users, so any human who has been signing into a shared service account through the browser is in scope and will be blocked. Second, an integration user that a person occasionally logs into through the UI is not really API-only.

Find the accounts at risk. The Waive-MFA permission maps to the API field PermissionsBypassMFAForUILogins, so you can list who holds it:

-- Waive-MFA holders via permission sets
SELECT AssigneeId, Assignee.Name, Assignee.Email, Assignee.Username,
       Assignee.IsActive, PermissionSet.Name
FROM PermissionSetAssignment
WHERE PermissionSet.PermissionsBypassMFAForUILogins = true

For each holder, decide whether it is a true integration identity or a human in disguise. Move real integrations onto a dedicated integration user with no interactive UI login, authenticate them through named credentials and IP allowlisting rather than a shared password, and move the humans onto their own accounts with a registered verifier. If you would rather audit this from the command line, our own sf-audit plugin resolves privileged access and flags integration and service accounts across profiles and permission sets in one read-only command. The new guest and access-control work is covered in Salesforce Guest User Exposure: How sf-audit Grades It by Real Reachability, and the hands-on first run is in Catch Salesforce Security Gaps in One Command.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: Did Salesforce cancel MFA enforcement?

A: No. It paused enforcement of standard MFA for all employee users and then published a revised schedule, restarting sandboxes on 10 July 2026 and production on 20 July, with release groups running to 3 September. Salesforce has been explicit that MFA and phishing-resistant MFA remain required. It was a short delay to both tiers, not a reprieve.

Q: Was phishing-resistant MFA for admins delayed too?

A: Yes, by less than three weeks. Salesforce's change log moved its production start from 1 July to 20 July 2026, the same start date as the all-employee tier. If your admins do not have a security key, built-in authenticator, passkey, or certificate registered, they are in scope to be blocked now, so this is still the tier to act on first.

Q: Why did Salesforce pause it?

A: A defect in the phishing-resistant enrolment flow prompted users who already had a security key to register a new one, which would have caused widespread confusion at enforcement. Salesforce paused the broad rollout to resolve that flow rather than push it to every employee at once.

Q: Is the 20 July date still real?

A: It was, as the start of a production wave by release group rather than a single cutover. The last groups were enforced on 1 and 3 September 2026. If your org has an extension, your date is on the extension's release update in Setup. To check the groups, confirm the live schedule on Salesforce Help articles 005321561 and 005321563 before planning around a specific day.

Q: What happens to our API integrations on these dates?

A: API-only integration logins are not in scope for the MFA requirement, and the Waive-MFA exemption still applies to them. The risk is accounts that are not really API-only: a service account a person signs into through the browser is in scope and will be blocked. Move real integrations to a dedicated integration user with no UI login, and give the humans their own accounts.

Key Takeaways

  • Both MFA tiers paused, briefly. Sandboxes restarted on 10 July and production on 20 July 2026, running by release group until 3 September. Nothing else in the wave moved.
  • The admin tier is live. Phishing-resistant MFA for privileged users is enforced. If admins lack a qualifying method, they can be blocked now.
  • Extension holders get one more 90-day extension, and only one. Salesforce emails each org its new date, and the extra 90 days are requested from the release update in Setup.
  • The pause was a bug fix, not a policy change. Existing security keys were wrongly prompted to re-register; the requirement itself stands.
  • A working login is not proof of compliance. The staggered rollout means your org may not have been reached yet. Verify enforcement directly in Setup and Login History.
  • Use the time to verify, recover, and lock down, especially the integration and service accounts that the changed exemption now leaves exposed.

What's Next?

Recommended Reading:

Action Items:

  1. Confirm every admin has a working phishing-resistant method registered, and that early-registered security keys still authenticate after the fix.
  2. Run the Waive-MFA query, then move real integrations to API-only users and humans onto their own accounts before the 20 July wave.
  3. Write your own Transaction Security Policy for report exports before the 13 July default lands.

Resources & References

Responses

Checking your session.

Loading responses.